Using a survivorship and selection bias free database of actively managed private Turkish Pension funds we show that most managers are not able to provide performance above and beyond what could be earned by passive indexing. At its simplest, funds fail to beat their self-declared benchmarks on average. With respect to a common multi-asset factor model, the fund industry as a whole does not deliver a positive alpha and neither does the average fund. Cross-sectional regressions indicate that exposure to government bonds explains the pension fund returns, rather than exposure to the stock market. An average fund manager is only able to provide 34 basis points of "selection return" per annum on top of the "style return" computed from his reported asset allocations. Finally, a naïve trading strategy that buys the top 10 funds in each year and holds them for the next year earns about the same annual return as a passive strategy of holding a half-and-half blend of Turkish stocks and government bonds. Taken as a whole, our results strongly support the philosophy of passive investing and highlight the need for low-cost index funds in the Turkish Pension fund system.
Introduction
Despite mounting evidence that retail investors are no better off investing with active funds, the allure of active investing is enduring. In a recent Wall Street Journal 1 article, even Burton Malkiel, one of the most vocal proponents of passive investing, confides that he uses ten percent of his investment portfolio to actively trade individual stocks. Nevertheless, he regards these focused bets as "a hobby" and says "For your serious retirement money, you don't gamble." We believe this to be sound advice and present empirical evidence which we hope will convince the majority of pension fund managers, or their parent companies, to (at least) offer passive alternatives to their clients. This paper mainly contributes to the literature on the performance of pension funds where academic studies have been limited due to the scarcity of data. The basic takeaway of the few available studies is that in the US, pension funds "can't beat the market". Ippolito and Turner (1987) report negative CAPM alphas net of fees, and Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) report on average 1.3% annual underperformance compared to the S&P 500 Index, before fees. Coggin, Fabozzi and Rahman (1993) provide a more nuanced view in that, if one chooses a benchmark in line with the managers' investment style (rather than the S&P 500), then it is possible to detect some positive security selection ability. Even so, their data also contains evidence of negative market timing by managers. Ferson and Khang (2002) find no evidence of abnormal performance in their sample of equity pension funds based on a new conditional portfolio weight based measure they develop. Finally, Busse, Goyal and Wahal (2010) show that the crosssectional distribution of actual fund alphas are below their simulated counterparts, indicating luck rather than skill in determining abnormal performance.
Pension funds do not fare well in Europe either. Angelidis and Tessaromatis (2010) show that an average Greek pension fund loses a hypothetical return of 0.91% based on the Sharpe Ratio of the domestic equity market index. Jackowicz and Kowalewski (2012) find that the median Polish pension fund provides an alpha of 1% per annum and incidentally also charges an expense ratio of 1%. In the UK, Blake, Lehmann and Timmermann (1999) show that 96% of the variation in pension fund returns could be explained by the variation of "normal" return. They find statistically insignificant selection returns and significantly negative market timing returns, 1 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304330904579137410675036086 -2 -leading them to conclude that a randomly selected pension fund would have been better served with passive indexes.
Moving onto Middle East and Asia, we believe ours is the first study on the performance of pension funds in the region. Using the complete universe of Turkish pension funds, we show that active funds on average fail to overperform their self-declared benchmarks. For funds without a self-declared benchmark (called "flexible") the average return is below the average return on short-term (< 1 month) Turkish government bonds. We perform time-series regressions with 11 asset class factors and find that fund style indices (obtained from our data provider) do not deliver any significantly positive alphas, neither does the composite pension fund index representing the value-weighted portfolio of all existing funds. When we examine individual funds, a panel regression reveals that the average alpha is not significantly different from zero; notwithstanding some funds with significantly positive alphas. A unique feature of our dataset due to the regulatory environment is that it is not only limited to net asset values; we also have information on funds' portfolio composition at the asset class level. To pick up any selection ability of a manager that might have been missed by the regression framework, we perform "style analysis" of individual funds developed by Sharpe (1992) . We find that only 9% of all the managers are able to provide a positive selection return, and none of them are equity fund managers.
Intrigued by this lack of performance we investigate further what explains the returns of these pension funds. We find that exposures (betas) to short-term and long-term government bond returns are the only significant (>1%) factors that explain the cross-section of fund returns. Put differently, Turkish Pension funds appear to be "market-neutral". If one considers government bond indexes as proxies for macroeconomic risks, then our results match what Bali, Brown and Caglayan (2011) find for US hedge funds, namely that default premium and inflation premium betas best explain the cross-sectional dispersion in hedge fund returns. We believe ours is the first study to document such a linkage between hedge funds and pension funds.
However, we do admit that the empirical evidence we provide on cross-sectional dispersion in pension fund returns is hardly conclusive and grants further research.
From the perspective of a retail investor planning to contribute to a pension plan, the most important question is how to pick a fund. Our results indicate that randomly picking a fund is not going to yield superior returns, even though there are managers out there who can provide -3 -superior performance. We consider one simple strategy that a naïve investor could possibly implement: a potential pension fund investor observes the top ten best performing managers at the end of each year and invest a 1/10th of his or her savings with them. Assuming this equalweighted portfolio of pension funds gets rebalanced once every year for the eight years of our sample period, we find that the terminal value this strategy achieves would not be any different than what one could earn by investing in a passive government bond index. When we consider the fact that all our analyses were performed before fees, the inescapable conclusion is that the retail investors would be much better off if they were offered index funds in the Turkish private pension system. This article also contributes to the study of market efficiency in emerging markets. It is commonly believed that emerging markets are not as informationally efficient as their counterparts in developed countries. Bekaert and Harvey (2002) provide a review of the literature that finds higher serial correlation in returns and higher excess returns to portfolio strategies based on stock characteristics in emerging markets. A more recent study, Griffin, Kelly and Nardari (2010), warns against using the "anomaly" tests engineered in developed markets to conclude inefficiency for emerging markets; nonetheless the study also sides with the notion that pricing in emerging markets is less efficient based on the analysis of cross-country transaction and information production costs. While Turkey is only one example of an emerging market country, our results suggest a different view; one of an efficient market for domestic stocks and bonds.
The funds in our sample are all managed by large parent banks with many years of experience in capital markets. They have the technological resources to trade quickly and cheaply, and the human capital to produce information. In addition, they are not constrained by fund outflows in down markets, a common problem for mutual and hedge funds. Under these favorable conditions one would expect them to overperform passive indexes if the markets they trade in were truly inefficient. Hence, our not-so-flattering results for the Turkish pension fund industry in fact speak very highly of the capital markets in Turkey. The consistency of our results with the literature emanating from the US and Europe can be interpreted as Turkish markets having reached a level of informational efficiency comparable to that of the developed economies around the world.
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Background on the Turkish Private Pension System
The Individual Pension System (IPS) in Turkey was officially commenced on October 27, 2003. The system aims to complement the public pension system and is part of a drive to boost the domestic savings rate in the country. Participation in the IPS is voluntary and based on defined contribution plans. The contributions collected from participants are pooled in individual accounts overseen by pension companies and invested in pension funds managed by asset management companies. The participants themselves decide on portfolio allocations spanning a wide selection across asset classes provided under the terms of their IPS plans. Despite the increasing significance of pension funds in the Turkish financial sector, there have not been any academic studies on the subject. The little we know on their performance has been provided by the PMC or by the funds themselves. These funds closely resemble the defined-contribution plans in the US where employees do not get a fixed amount after they reach retirement age, but the value of the investments that have accumulated in their pension plan.
-5 -Our aim is to provide a comprehensive and accurate evaluation of the performance of Turkish pension funds and hopefully help individuals better manage their savings.
Data Description
Our fund data comes from RASYONET, a private data provider that is widely used in the financial industry in Turkey. RASYONET compiles its data from the regulatory filings of funds; hence the data is completely free of reporting-bias and survivorship bias. We have daily observations on fund asset values, prices, gross and net returns, self-declared benchmarks, and asset allocations. The sample covers the complete time period for which the private pension fund system have existed in Turkey. Since there are only a few months of observations in 2003, we choose to start our sample in January 2004. The sample ends at the end of December 2011. Because daily returns are extremely noisy, we choose to work with weekly returns instead for our analysis. We define weekly return as the cumulative daily return from Wednesday to Tuesday for all fund and index series.
The index data on Turkish fixed income securities comes from the "Turkish Association of Institutional Investment Managers" (TKYD), a private organization whose stated function is "to raise public awareness about institutional investment firms within the investment community by reaching larger audiences". They maintain and publish various indices which are publicly available and widely adopted. 2 For world-wide indices we use Bloomberg.
Funds are categorized by their investment strategies stated in their prospectus (the fund's name will also refer to the category). Some of these are self-explanatory (i.e., equity, money market), but some need explanation. If a fund declares itself to be a "Flexible" fund, it is no longer obligated to report a benchmark to the regulators and can invest in any asset class as it deems fit. Many funds naturally follow this strategy. Some funds classify themselves as "Balanced" or "Mixed" instead of "Flexible" but from a regulatory perspective they are identical.
Government External Debt and Internal Debt categories refer to funds that invest in the Turkish
Treasury debt market, either in Eurobonds or Turkish Lira denominated bonds, respectively.
The law requires all funds to report their asset values in Turkish Liras hence the funds that hold mainly Eurobonds have returns that behave similar to holding foreign exchange.
-6 -We drop "Index" funds because our focus in on active management. It is however interesting to note that there are only two index funds available. Overall, our sample includes 48 flexible funds, 23 equity funds, 25 government external debt funds, 32 government internal debt funds, 9 international funds, and 20 money market funds, making a total of 157 funds.
Results

Descriptive Statistics on Risk and Return
We begin our analysis by computing the average returns and standard deviations of individual funds and indexes. We use gross returns -returns before fees -hence the numbers overstate the actual return that an individual investor would have earned. However, it is the gross return that is relevant in this setting where our objective is to quantify the added value of active fund managers. Table 1 reports cross-sectional averages of weekly return measures along with the standard deviations.
TABLE 1 HERE
In Panel A, we find that the average fund has earned around 11.3% per annum, with the equity funds leading the pack with 13.6%. It is somewhat surprising that the funds in the "Flexible" category have underperformed equity funds, considering the fact that these funds are not bound by the policy allocations that restrict other funds. With these funds managers are free to invest in any asset class, hence have more potential for demonstrating security selection or market timing; however the results indicate that having more options appears to be detrimental to their performance. International funds turn out to be the worst performers overall, but keep in mind that these returns are based on Turkish Liras and over this time period the dollar has appreciated relative to the Lira. On the face of it, all funds seem to be able to generate sizeable returns, but we will see that the picture changes when their returns are compared to that of their benchmarks.
Most funds do not fare well when compared against their benchmark returns (also called policy returns in the literature). In the benchmark-adjusted return column we see that the aver--7 -age fund is not able to beat its benchmark. Even without going into risk adjustments, this simple finding immediately raises the question of why most funds do not passively follow their benchmarks. The funds that have been able to beat their benchmarks on average are the ones that mostly invest in Turkish Government securities, but even here the maximum overperformance is only about 21 basis points. It is also important to add that it is the funds themselves that setup and publish their benchmark returns. We as the researchers are not deciding on which benchmark would be appropriate for which style of fund.
Standard deviations of funds in different categories are in line with what we know about asset classes in general. Equity funds exhibit the highest standard deviation (around 25%), and money market funds exhibit the lowest (less than 1%). Considering the mean return difference of about 2% between these two categories we feel that equity funds offer a fairly low risk-return tradeoff even if investors could invest in the equal-weighted portfolio of all equity funds. The high returns earned by money market and government bond funds may surprise some readers.
The high returns mostly reflect the high interest rate environment present in Turkey. In fact, the passive indexes of (mostly) risk-free securities have had even higher returns during this time.
Panel B reports the average returns of passive (non-tradeable) indexes in the Turkish market over the same time period for comparison. Turkish government bonds clearly stand out here, providing nearly 16% return (not factoring in inflation). Turkish equities offer slightly higher returns -2% premium over the "risk-free" -yet with much higher volatility. Panel C reports some popular developed and emerging market indexes. Because of the financial crisis in 2008, the high returns one would have earned in US or European stocks in the years leading up to the crisis are completely wiped out. Investors who have chosen the safest instruments, namely US and German Treasury bills, have paradoxically earned higher returns than the equities during this episode. Overall, these asset class index returns help us to put the relatively high pension fund returns into context. For example, we cannot find a single category of funds whose average performance is better than a corresponding index. If equity funds followed the Borsa Istanbul 100 index rather than actively picking stocks, they could improve their performance by 4% per year (on average). Even the money market funds could boost their returns by 2% by cutting down on trading and rolling over repos instead. 
Fund Index Regressions
"Alpha" is probably the most popular metric in assessing the performance of active managers. While it suffers from the "joint hypothesis problem" of the validity of the risk factors used in its estimation, the literature has converged on three or four factors as reasonable proxies for risk. In our setting, the typically used SMB and HML factors of Fama and French (1996) are not available for the Turkish stock market. Therefore we use indexes on major asset classes as the factors in our regressions instead. The advantage of this approach is that the factors do not need to be "priced" for the model to be valid. As long as the factors account for the comovement in fund returns, "alpha" is a meaningful measure of the return provided by the manager over and
on top of what could be achieved solely by passive indexing. The indexes we use as the righthand side variables in our regressions cover all major asset classes and are listed in Appendix 1.
The dependent variables in the regressions are the fund style indexes we obtained from our data provider. These indexes are value-weighted hence represent the performance of the sectors of the pension fund industry, rather than the performance of individual funds or a family of funds. Even though our earlier results showed that the average fund did not beat its benchmark, it is possible that larger funds may be overperforming while smaller funds may be underperforming, thus pulling the average down. If that is the case, then we should be able to observe some significant alphas from these regressions. These regressions are also useful for understanding the sensitivity of each category of funds to various asset classes. The results are presented in Table 2 .
-9 - The first column represents the composite index of all funds. Its alpha is not statistically different from zero. Columns 2 through 8 represent the fund style categories and none of them shows any significantly positive alpha. In fact all alphas are negative with the exception of money market funds' which is less than 1% and not statistically significant. Government External Debt funds show a statistically significant negative alpha of 6.4% (annualized). All regressions have high R-squared values meaning that our choice of indexes capture the variation in funds sufficiently. The coefficients that turn out to be significant are in agreement with the style of the fund. For example the equity "beta" of equity funds is around 0.8, and the bond "beta" of government internal debt funds is around 0.9. In all, we do not observe any evidence of certain fund categories demonstrating any better performance than the asset classes they invest in.
Panel Regressions
In this section we investigate individual fund alphas and try to answer the question whether the "average" fund can generate positive alpha. The dependent variable now is the individual weekly fund return. We require funds to have at least 52 weekly returns to be included in the analysis and hence end up with 136 funds out of the 157 available.
We measure the individual fund performance relative to passive benchmarks as follows:
where , is fund i, week t return and the set of , are weekly returns on passive benchmark indexes (listed in Appendix 1).
We first estimate the model in equation ( 1 ) using pooled OLS regression. We independently double cluster the robust standard errors in the regression by fund and by week. In this setup,
-10 -estimated alpha and betas can be considered as overall averages for the funds included in our sample. The results are presented in Table 3 .
TABLE 3 HERE
The overall alpha of negative 4 basis points is not statistically different from zero and echoes the lack of excess performance we document in our analysis on the style indexes. Judging by the significance of beta estimates, a randomly picked private pension fund in Turkey would be significantly exposed to the risk of several domestic and international asset classes.
The standard panel regression outlined above, while common in practice, does not rule out the potential impact of unobserved effects, such as manager ability, on fund returns. To address possible fund-level heterogeneity issues and to have a more robust conclusion on Turkish pension funds' abnormal returns, we re-estimate equation ( 1 ) using a random-coefficients model.
To be more specific, the individual fund return is now modeled as a combination of population characteristics ( and ) and fund-specific effects ( and , ) that are unique to a particular fund.
We use the random-coefficients model because it allows correction for heteroskedasticity and fund-specific regression coefficients. Since the regression is estimated as a panel, it is also robust to outliers. The specification of random coefficients allows different funds to have different intercepts and slopes, allowing for fund-level divergence from population characteristics.
The underlying premise of the random coefficient model is that some subset of regression parameters may vary randomly from one fund to another, thereby accounting for sources of natural heterogeneity in the population. The and 's, which are assumed to be shared by all funds, allow us to make a general statement on the population parameters.
The last two columns of Table 3 give the estimates of the population parameters along with t-statistics based on robust standard errors accounting for cross-serial correlation in a given week and autocorrelation in a given fund. The results are remarkably similar to the results using -11 -the simple panel data regression: the overall alpha of 0.33 percent per year is neither economically nor statistically significant. This finding confirms what we have already learned from Table   1 with regards to the benchmark adjusted returns; pension funds in Turkey find it difficult to provide above average returns.
FIGURE 3 HERE
We also present the distribution of the alphas and the betas obtained from the random coefficients model. In Figure 3 , Panel A we can see that while the average alpha centers around zero, there are a number of funds with above average performance. In fact, roughly 70% of the funds display an alpha greater than zero. Yet, great performance is rare. We observe only 3% of the funds generating an alpha above 1.5%.
Panels B and C present the distribution of betas with respect to local and international indexes, respectively. What is immediately apparent is that most funds have at least some positive exposure to Turkish Government bonds and there is substantial variation in the levels of their exposures. The distribution of the equity market betas is perhaps more curious. Roughly 60% of the funds have little or no exposure to Turkish equities, and the ones that do are all "defensive" (betas less than 1). There are in fact only 16 funds with betas greater than 0.5 in our sample.
From an asset allocation perspective, such low levels of stock holdings are not likely be optimal for the average investor unless one assumes extreme levels of risk aversion. If pension funds represent the entire savings of the naïve investor, it is possible that he or she is underinvested in equities.
The Relation between Betas and Fund Returns
With the betas from the panel regression at hand, it is interesting to ask whether they explain the cross-section of fund returns. Under the APT for example, one would expect a linear relation between the risk premiums of systematic factors and the fund returns. Our asset class indexes are not direct measures of risk factors, nevertheless one can think of them as factormimicking portfolios which the APT allows. Hence, our objective is to discover which asset class betas are "priced" and propose links to the latent risk factors.
-12 -To this purpose we employ the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression methodology where we estimate the time-series factor betas using the random coefficients model in equation (2) (first-stage), and then run cross-sectional regressions of fund returns on their betas in each week (second-stage). Table 4 show that the exposure to short-term and long term government bonds explains a significant chunk of the cross-sectional variation in pension fund returns. Both risk premium estimates are around 14% per annum, with t-statistics of 6.55 and 5.95 respectively.
The average R-squared of the specification with all the factors is close to 85 percent and only goes down to 78 percent when international factors are dropped. These results indicate that pension fund managers are compensated for bearing the risk of Turkish government bonds.
The real surprising result from Table 4 is that the risk premium of the stock market does not turn out to be statistically significant. In other words, beta is "flat". Because this is not a test of an asset-pricing model, the interpretation of this finding is not necessarily a rejection of the linear relation between market risk and return. Rather, this non-result tells us that these funds are not generating their returns by taking on market risk. This finding is consistent with the distributions of market betas presented in Figure 3 , Panel 2. We have already seen that many funds do not have exposure to the equity market, hence the cross-sectional variation in their betas are probably too small to account for the variation in their returns.
The Fama-MacBeth regression results we present in this section bear a striking resemblance to the results in Caglayan (2011) and Caglayan (2014) . Bali et al. show that standard risk factors such as the value-weighted market return, Fama-French size and book-to-market factors among others, fail to explain the cross-section of hedge fund returns.
Instead, they present evidence that hedge fund returns are best explained by macroeconomic -13 -risk factors. If we were to view the government bond index returns in our study as proxies for macroeconomic risks then these results would indicate that Turkish Pension funds behave much like US hedge funds despite their institutional and regulatory differences. While this reasoning is only suggestive, it is in fact quite plausible when one considers the particulars of the Turkish economy. Unlike the risk-free US Treasuries, the Turkish Government bonds embed a default premium. This premium is highly sensitive to political and economic events which can be evidenced by the variation in Turkey's CDS spreads. In addition, the country has been experiencing double-digit inflation rates throughout the 2000s and while the inflation has fallen to single digits recently, it still exhibits large swings. Keep in mind that the bond indices we use are based on nominal prices hence are highly affected by inflation expectations. Lastly, the financial media in Turkey focuses almost exclusively on discount rate news (central bank policies, GDP growth, exchange rates, etc.), rather than company specific cash flow news (earnings, issuance, etc.) Taken together, we surmise that the daily activities of a typical Turkish pension fund may not be worlds apart from a directional global macro hedge fund.
Style versus Selection
While our previous performance analyses fail to detect a positive alpha for the average fund and for active management as a whole, there are still other ways that a fund manager can add "value" which the alpha may miss. Stocks returns are extremely noisy even at the weekly frequency we use, and even a large positive alpha that would be economically significant can be eschewed as statistically insignificant. The asset factor model framework also assumes fixed betas which may or may not represent how the managers invest in the real world. The "style" of a fund (given by the betas on asset class indexes) might drift over time, or a manager can quickly move in and out of cash at opportune times to deliver above average returns or to avoid a large loss. In this section, we use a variation of the methodology in Sharpe (1992) to break down the returns of a fund into "style" and "selection". Sharpe (1992) uses the beta coefficients from fiveyear rolling window regressions to determine a fund's style. He then subtracts the "style return"
from the realized return of the fund in the subsequent month to arrive at the manager's "selection return". Our data provides us with the asset allocations of each fund at each point in time hence we do not require a regression model to estimate the fund's style return, we can simply compute this number by multiplying the fraction of a fund's portfolio in a given asset class by -14 -the return of that asset class. This feature of our data nicely side-steps the problem of estimation error in betas. Moreover, the fund's asset allocations are public information (due to a regulatory law). Retail investors can go to any fund's website and observe these allocations on a daily basis. This makes "selection" return, defined here as the difference between the fund's realized return in a given week and its "style" return computed from one-week lagged asset weights, a very realistic proxy for the value added by the manager. Table 5 reports the cross-sectional means of selection returns across various fund categories. The grand mean -the full cross-sectional average of funds' average weekly selection returns -is 0.34% per annum. Government external debt, international, and money market funds report on average a negative selection return, whereas equity funds report the largest positive selection return, 2.47%. However based on the t-statistics of individual funds, not even a single equity fund displays a statistically significant selection return. Moreover, of the 152 funds that makes up our sample only 14 of them show statistically significant positive selection returns.
This finding can be interpreted as roughly 9% of the managers adding value over passive indexing, hardly a convincing case for active investing.
Let us now focus on the second column in Table 5 , the tracking error. A surprising result here is that both the flexible and equity funds, where active managers have large pools of securities to choose from, have a relatively low tracking error. Compare the 7.31% deviation of selection returns to the 25.21% deviation of raw returns of equity funds in Table 1 . The big reduction in the standard deviation indicates that it is mostly the style exposure of a fund that is contributing to its volatility. This is consistent with the stylized fact that most of the variation in mutual fund returns is driven by factor exposures, hence asset allocation choices are the first and foremost decisions retail investors need to make. Such close tracking of indexes by active funds have prompted some people to describe them as "closet indexers". The term refers to managers who charge an active management fee, but secretly follow the fund's benchmark, fearing underperformance. The low tracking error of the funds in our sample are signals of such behavior, however it is also possible that flexible funds are choosing to diversify across many assets while at the same time staying highly "active". Cremers and Petajisto (2009) propose a new "Active Share" measure, which can distinguish closet indexers from highly active managers who also -15 -make diversified stock picks. Unfortunately, since we do not have stock-level portfolio holding data to compute this measure we leave the question about the trading patterns of managers for future research.
The third column in Table 5 reports the information ratio which is based on the idea that it is the manager's private information (or skill in interpreting information) that generates the return over the benchmark. By dividing this "abnormal" return by its standard deviation, the information ratio is said to extract the "signal" from the "noise". The average information ratio in our sample is 0.09, which does not imply the existence of managers with superior information.
The low overall average we obtain is maybe a sign that most managers in our sample are trading on noise rather than information.
Picking Top Managers
Our results so far have indicated that very few funds are in fact able to provide superior returns than passive indexes. If however, the retail investor was somehow able to pick these very funds he could achieve above average returns. To see if such a strategy is feasible we employ a simple test: each year we rank the funds based on their returns and track the performance of the funds in the top 10 for the subsequent year. This is equivalent to a strategy of holding an equal-weighted portfolio of the top 10 funds of the prior year while rebalancing every year. We present the results in Table 6 .
TABLE 6 HERE
The average annualized return of investing with the best 10 funds in the flexible category is 14.17% which is only slightly above the risk-free return (proxied by the repo rate), but below the average returns on government bonds and stocks. The best 10 funds ranked according to their benchmark adjusted returns do somewhat better. Their average return is 18.11%, a figure right in between government bond and stock index returns. In Panel B we track the growth of 1000 Turkish Liras invested at the end of 2004 in these "top" funds. By the end of 2011 the holding period return is 175.44% for the strategy using benchmarked funds, and 141.63% for the strategy using un-benchmarked funds. These holding period returns are both below the return -16 -on government bonds therefore it is difficult to recommend such a strategy to retail investors. If the retail investor has put half his money into a fund that follows the government bond index and the other half into a fund that follows the stock market index he could have done better than investing with the top 10 flexible funds, or just as good as top 10 benchmarked funds. Given that his actual returns would be reduced by fund fees, there can hardly be any justification for preferring active funds in this scenario.
Conclusion
In this study we undertook a comprehensive analysis of the performance of Turkish Pension funds. On almost any test we ran, we failed to spot abnormal performance. The average fund does not beat its benchmark over the time period under study, even before fees. Fund style indexes fail to deliver any significant positive alphas and the average alpha of individual funds is not distinguishable from zero. These underwhelming results are not due to misspecification of the asset pricing model used to estimate alphas. We use an asset class factor model with 11 factors that include all major market indexes and explain almost 90% of the variation in fund returns. Still, if instead of alpha one uses the "selection return" as the measure of abnormal performance, that is, the return in excess of the benchmark return based on observed asset allocations -only 14 funds out of 152 provide significantly positive abnormal performance. Finally, we find that top performing funds in one year are not able to repeat their success in the following year, making it unrealistic for the retail investors to cherry-pick those few successful managers.
The literature on pension funds has been thin compared to mutual funds and our study hopes to close that gap. Our data is completely survivorship and reporting bias free and includes the complete universe of funds in the Turkish Private Pension system. The regulatory environment requires every fund to report their net asset values and asset allocations publicly at each day's end when markets close, in contrast to the quarterly or annual reports in the US. Such fine level of detailed information makes it possible to detect overperformance if it truly exists, however our results generally agree with the previous literature in that most managers "cannot beat the market".
-17 -We believe there are important policy implications of these findings. Remembering that the funds in the Turkish Private Pension system are defined-contribution plans, the underperformance of many managers are putting many individuals' retirement savings in jeopardy. It is also important to remember that passive indexes used in our study are not directly investable, therefore the retail investor does not have much choice other than investing in one (or a few) of the active funds. Passive funds which track main asset class indexes at low cost are a desperately needed commodity. The policy makers have so far focused on reducing fees and providing more flexibility to retail investors in switching between funds. However, the average expense ratio is still relatively high compared to the US and shows very little cross-sectional variation. Indexing is a fail-safe mechanism to reduce fund fees. We believe that pension plan contributors would be much better served with lower-cost passive alternatives, in addition to the active funds currently available.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Index Definitions XU100: A value-weighted index of the 100 largest stocks that trade on Borsa Istanbul.
KYDON_BRUT:
A volume-weighted index of overnight repurchase/reverse repurchase agreements that take place on Borsa Istanbul.
KYD30:
Index of short-term Turkish Government bonds. Securities need to have less than 60 days until maturity to be included in the index and take on weights that are inversely proportional to the difference between the days left until maturity and 30.
KYDTUM:
A value-weighted index that contains all Turkish Government bonds regardless of maturity.
KYDFXDIBS_USD:
A value-weighted index of Turkish Government bonds denominated in US dollars issued in the local market with maturities less than 2 years.
KYDEBOND_USD: A value-weighted index of Eurobonds denominated in US dollars and issued
by the Turkish Government with maturities up to 30 years.
USD_DS:
An index that tracks the return of the US dollar/Turkish Lira exchange rate.
MXWO: MSCI World Index. Includes a collection of stocks from 24 developed markets.
MXEF: MSCI Emerging Markets Index. Includes a collection of stocks from 21 emerging markets.
USG1TR:
Bloomberg/EFFAS Government Bond Index that tracks US Treasuries with 1 to 3 year maturities.
GRG1TR: Bloomberg/EFFAS Government Bond Index that tracks German Government Treasuries with 1 to 3 year maturities.
JPEIGLBL: JP Morgan EMBI Global Total Return Index. The index covers liquid US dollar denominated debt instruments from 27 emerging market countries.
-24 - (2) in the text, using the full sample period. Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags are used to compute the t-statistics. The coefficients are given as annualized percentages.
(1) Mean Selection Return is the arithmetic average of the weekly realized return of a fund minus the its "style" return, which is given by the product of the asset allocations of the fund at the end of the previous week and the returns on the corresponding asset class indexes for the present week.
Tracking Error is the standard deviation of the selection return. Information Ratio is the mean of selection return divided by the standard deviation of selection return. Number of funds with statistically significant selection returns is determined by the standard error of the mean from the time-series of the fund's selection return. All returns are given as annualized percentages. 
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